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Report to Examiners on PhD Thesis Revision 
 
I do appreciate Dr. Frankie Chau and Professor Xiaming Liu for their invaluable 
suggestions as the guiding principle of modifying my PhD thesis with minor 
corrections. It is my honour to learn from both examiners’ professional research 
attitudes and skills in further improving my PhD thesis. In this report, I list the 
examiners’ suggestions as shown in the Examiners’ Joint Report. All page numbers 
discussed below are based on the modified thesis while the old page numbers with 
prior contents before the modification are also provided within the bracket. The 
modified contents are quoted with italic types. Moreover, since examiners’ comments 
are mostly for the second chapter in my thesis, I mainly discuss the minor corrections 
in that chapter while other essential changes are also presented in this report. 
 
 1. Further explanation is needed of the extent to which the hypotheses 
developed have extended our understanding of the topic. Where possible, 
further development and justification need to be provided. 
 
Prior studies on CEO overconfidence or dominance effect of corporate takeovers 
mainly focus on bidder side since they pay the premiums and own the strong position 
over the acquisition process (Brown and Sarma, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
However, as mergers are different with acquisitions, researches on CEO 
overconfidence and dominance effects could not only focus on the bidder side as 
target side may also own the negotiation power. Therefore, to better our understanding 
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of the current research topic of managerial cognitive bias effect on terms of mergers 
since one specific merger deal is a negotiation product between both target and bidder 
sides while one part’s disagreement may lead to the deal under the incomplete 
situation. Moreover, the purpose of designing empirical hypotheses into these three 
parts refers to better our investigation in whether the wealth transfer phenomenon 
could be found in bank mergers. Therefore, the current introduction part of the 
empirical hypothesis in page 28 [old version: P28] is shown as below: 
 
“In general, mergers, acquisitions or takeovers are usually regarded as similar 
corporation financial decisions. However, unlike acquisitions or takeovers could also 
have hostile cases, a merger normally involves the mutual decision of both target and 
bidder firms as they will be merged as one entity. Therefore, a merger is friendly, full 
of negotiations with two relatively equal parts (Reed et al., 1995). Roll (1986) 
indicates a general three-step merger process. First, acquiring firms find suitable 
target firms. Second, based on expected synergy gains and the present value 
estimation of specific target firms, acquiring firms bid for target firms. In friendly 
mergers, this process can be negotiated between management teams from the target 
and acquiring firms. Third, if the offer is satisfactory to both sides, the merger will be 
undertaken. Therefore, it is essential to develop empirical predictions that cover the 
merger procedure as well as perspectives based on bidder, target and combined side, 
respectively. The core spirit for developing empirical predictions is to detect whether 
there exists the wealth transfer process from bidders to targets under the situation that 
CEOs may behave as either overconfident or dominant. Moreover, different with prior 
study by Malmendier and Tate (2008), target CEOs are also included to investigate 
cognitive bias effects on determining terms of merger since executive compensation 
data could be gathered from the EDGAR database. Following prior studies 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Brown and Zorn, 2006; Liu and Taffler, 2008; 
Brown and Sarma, 2007), six main hypotheses are developed based on the target, 
bidder, and combined sides. ” 
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 2. Better explain the purpose and importance of having univariate analysis 
and include a brief discussion on the potential drawbacks/limitations of this 
preliminary analysis. 
 
The prior version of the thesis does not provide any introduction to identify the 
purpose in adopting the univaraite analysis. In fact, as the preliminary analysis of 
multivariate regressions, univariate analysis is applied to provide a brief statistical 
discussion of the dependent and independent variables. In my PhD thesis, univariate 
analysis is especially crucial for comparing different groups of CEOs who are sorted 
out based on the varied CEO attitudes. In order to enhance the structural analysis of 
empirical results, I add the purpose and importance of having univariate analysis in 
page 53-54 [old version: P50]： 
 
“The univariate analysis is a kind of preliminary statistical analysis that contains the 
measurements applied for the unit analysis based on the specific time window one at a 
time. The main purpose of adopting univariate analysis is to investigate the average 
condition where variance and standard deviation figures are gathered.  
 
Comparing with other analysis methods, univariate analysis is predominant in several 
aspects. First, univariate analysis is more straightforward in interpreting statistical 
results as multivariate models may usually produce unexpected results that are 
difficult to be explained. Second, as data used in univariate analysis is assured, 
results based on the univariate analysis are more reliant in providing accurate 
predictions than other types of analysis approach in signaling multivariate results. 
Third, univariate analysis is flexible for researchers to change analysis scenarios as it 
shows modified results when one variable changes and other factors remain 
unchanged.  
 
Univariate analysis also owns significant shortcomings and thus should be further 
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enhanced through multivariate analysis. As multivariate analysis provides statistical 
estimation results from more than one response variable at a time, univariate analysis 
is unable to perform such systematic analysis and less comprehensive in the panel 
data set. Furthermore, univariate analysis fails to display the statistical relationship 
among different variables since it only considers one variable at a time.  
 
In summary, univariate analysis is a direct statistical approach in discussing simple 
information for obtained data while it also shows reasonable predictions of 
multivariate analysis results. However, due to the inherent limitations, univariate 
analysis results usually acts as the prior-step of the multivariate analysis where 
results should be further improved through multivariate models (Altman, 1968).” 
 
 3. Provide fuller information on the reasoning behind the grouping of bank 
CEOs into three different groups (overconfident, dominating and 
overconfident-dominating CEOs).  
 
During the VIVA, Dr. Chau suggests me to add the descriptive statistics for bank 
CEOs who are none overconfident-dominant. I do agree with this comment since 
univaraite analysis afterwards provides the comparison analysis between CEOs who 
have cognitive bias problem and CEOs who are neither overconfident nor dominating 
the board. Therefore, the following analysis in Table 2.3 may be abrupt without the 
prior distribution summary of four kinds of CEOs (OV, DOM, OV_DOM and 
NOV_DOM). Therefore, Table 2.2 is comprehensive through adding the distribution 
information of none overconfident-dominant target and bidder CEOs. I attach the 
brief discussion of the new Table 2.2 in Page 50 [old version: P48] and Page 52 [old 
version: P49] as follow: 
 
“In order to investigate whether CEO attributes are volatile or centralized based on 
different time periods, a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the CEO attribute, 
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bidder and target CEOs are sorted out in terms of cognitive bias types like 
overconfident, dominating, overconfident-dominating and none 
overconfident-dominating characteristics. As discussed in Brown and Sarma (2007) 
and Malmendier and Tate (2008), CEO cognitive bias may also be affected by market 
environment and thus CEO beliefs may behave as centralized or fluctuated over 
different time periods. Panels A and B of Table 2.2 show the annual distribution of 
overconfident, dominating, overconfident-dominating and none 
overconfident-dominating target and acquiring CEOs, respectively. Briefly, 
overconfident, dominant and overconfident-dominant target CEOs are concentrated 
from 1997 to 2000 whilst same evidence could not be obtained for those percentages 
of acquiring CEO attributes.” 
 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for Bank Mergers with Overconfident, Dominating, and 
Overconfident–Dominating CEOs 
This table shows the summary statistics for bank mergers with overconfident, dominating, and 
overconfident-dominating CEOs. Panel A reports the distribution of target CEOs with these three attributes over 
the period 1996-2006, while the distribution of bidder CEOs with these three attributes is shown in panel B. The 
variables OV_T, DOM_T, OV_DOM_T and Non_OV_DOM_T are for overconfident, dominating, 
overconfident-dominating and none overconfident-dominating target CEOs, respectively, while OV_A, DOM_A, 
OV_DOM_A and Non_OV_DOM_A are for overconfident, dominating, overconfident-dominating and none 
overconfident-dominating acquiring CEOs, respectively. Firm-related fundamental characteristics are presented in 
panel C. Size is the logarithmic value of the book value of total assets; ROE is calculated as the net income 
available divided by the fiscal year end book value of the common equity of shareholders; MB is the 
market-to-book ratio, computed as the sum of total assets and the market value of equity, minus the book value of 
equity, divided by total assets; CA is the CA ratio, which equals to the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital divided by 
the risky weighted average assets. Here OP is CEO ownership percentage, calculated as the percentage of the 
number of shares held by the CEO divided by the company’s common shares outstanding × 1,000,000. EBS is the 
efficient board size, a dummy variable equal to one if the board size is between four and 12 directors, and zero 
otherwise. The subscripts A and T indicate acquiring banks and target banks, respectively. All variables are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement date. The p-values are in parentheses 
below the coefficients. Here *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Bank mergers with overconfident, dominating, and overconfident-dominating target CEOs by year 
Year OV_T % DOM_T % OV_DOM_T % 
Non_OV                      
_DOM_T 
% 
1996 2 3.33  3 5.77 2 5.56  2 8.70  
1997 6 10.00  7 13.46 6 16.67  2 8.70  
1998 7 11.67  8 15.38 4 11.11  1 4.35  
1999 10 16.67  6 11.54 5 13.89  4 17.39  
2000 10 16.67  8 15.38 7 19.44  0 0.00  
2001 5 8.33  5 9.62 1 2.78  2 8.70  
2002 0 0.00  1 1.92 0 0.00  1 4.35  
2003 6 10.00  6 11.54 4 11.11  4 17.39  
2004 4 6.67  3 5.77 2 5.56  4 17.39  
2005 8 13.33  4 7.69 4 11.11  3 13.04  
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2006 2 3.33  1 1.92 1 2.78  0 0.00  
Overall 60 100 52 100 36 100 23 100 
Panel B: Bank mergers with overconfident, dominating, and overconfident-dominating acquiring CEOs by year 
Year OV_A % DOM_A % OV_DOM_A % 
Non_OV             
_DOM_A 
% 
1996 4 7.02 4 7.55 4 10.53 1 3.57  
1997 6 10.53 5 9.43 4 10.53 2 7.14  
1998 5 8.77 7 13.21 3 7.89 4 14.29  
1999 11 19.30 8 15.09 5 13.16 1 3.57  
2000 8 14.04 5 9.43 5 13.16 3 10.71  
2001 5 8.77 5 9.43 3 7.89 4 14.29  
2002 2 3.51 1 1.89 1 2.63 0 0.00  
2003 5 8.77 5 9.43 4 10.53 6 21.43  
2004 5 8.77 6 11.32 4 10.53 2 7.14  
2005 5 8.77 6 11.32 4 10.53 4 14.29  
2006 1 1.75 1 1.89 1 2.63 1 3.57  
Overall 57 100 53 100 38 100 28 100 
 
 4. While the statistical methods applied seem to be appropriate, a number of 
the results need to be checked for significance and also the low R-squares 
must be clearly acknowledged and commented on. 
 
During the VIVA, Professor Xiaming Liu points out the phenomenon of relatively 
lower adjusted R-squares for regression results. He mentions that the adjusted 
R-squares in economic studies should usually around 40% while that value is only 
around 6% for target CAR regression models and 10% for bidder CAR regression 
results in my thesis. Hence, although empirical finance regression models normally 
have low R-squares, if I fail to recognize that problem, the analysis procedure is not 
precise and comprehensive and thus regression results may not be convinced. 
Therefore, I discuss the low adjusted R-squares phenomenon through comparing with 
prior studies in page 76 [old version: P65]: 
 
“To sum up here, estimating findings shown in Tables 2.7，2.8 and 2.9 confirm the 
phenomenon that overconfident CEOs do affect the terms of mergers in some extents, 
especially when overconfident CEOs own dominating decision power. This kind of 
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improvement could also be recognized through the increasing adjusted    (around 20% 
and 5% for target premiums and target CARs) when comparing with the adjusted    
(around 13% and 7%, respectively) in Brown and Zorn (2006). Similarly, the adjusted 
   of bidder side model is about 9% and 17% for merger premiums and bidder CARs 
while that number is approximately 12% and 10% in Brown and Zorn (2006) and 8% 
for acquirer CARs in Malmendier and Tate (2008).” 
 
 5. Add a correlation coefficient matrix for the dependent and independent 
variables before the presentation of regression results. More could be 
usefully said about the potential problems / symptoms of multicollinearity in 
the main regression analysis.  
 
Dr. Chau emphasizes the importance of developing a correlation coefficient matrix for 
regression variables in order to detect whether regression models may have the 
multicollinearity problem. In the new version of my PhD thesis, I discuss the 
multicollinearity problem in two steps. Firstly, I analyze the symptoms of 
multicollinearity and its influence to the precise of estimating results. Secondly, I 
select two approaches in detecting the multicollinearity problem. One is a correlation 
coefficient matrix shown in Table 2.5, the other approach that I pay more attention is 
the variation inflation factors (VIF) analysis shown in Table 2.6. Building upon the 
investigation of multicollinearity problem, multivariate analysis in the new version is 
more convincible than the prior version without any diagnose test of multicollinearity. 
The following part shows the multicollinearity analysis including Table 2.5 and 2.6 
which starts from page 61in the modified thesis [old version: P57]: 
 
“Multicollinearity is a statistical problem when at least two explanatory variables in 
a regression model are highly correlated. A multicollinearity phenomenon could lead 
to the high P-value while the confidence interval is wide and thus decreases the 
significance level of main explanatory variables. In order to detect the potential 
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multicollinearity problem over regression models from 2.4.1 to 2.6.3, three 
correlation matrices have been developed and results are shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Panels A, B and C of Table 2.5 indicate the correlation results of regression models 
for target, bidder and combined side, respectively. In general, the correlation 
coefficients of main independent variables, such as overconfidence, dominance and 
overconfidence-dominance, do not show the extreme correlation with each other 
while there is also no evidence that main explanatory variables are highly correlated 





Table 2.5 Correlation Matrices of Explanatory Variables   
Table 2.5 shows the preliminary correlation analysis for explanatory variables of regression models 2.4.1 to 2.6.3. Panels A, B and C display the correlation matrix of estimation models for 
target, bidder and combined side, respectively. Premium is the one-week offer price prior to the merger announcement date from Thomson One Banker.      and      refer to market 
responses for target and acquiring firms, which is the three-day CARs computed by the market model with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio over the period (-250, -21) (the merger 
announcement day is denoted as day 0).The variables OV_T, DOM_T and OV_DOM_T are for overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating target CEOs, respectively, while OV_A, 
DOM_A and OV_DOM_A are for overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating acquiring CEOs, respectively. The payment method (PM) involves a dummy variable that equals 
one if a deal is financed with more than 50% cash, and zero otherwise; GEO_DIV and ACT_DIV refer to geography diversifying and activity diversifying mergers; Relative size (RS) is defined 
as the fiscal year end book value of total assets in target banks divided by the book value of total assets in bidder banks before the announcement date. Size is the logarithmic value of the book 
value of total assets; ROE is calculated as the net income available divided by the fiscal year end book value of the common equity of shareholders; MB is the market-to-book ratio, computed as 
the sum of total assets and the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets; CA is the CA ratio, which equals to the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital divided by 
the risky weighted average assets; OP is CEO ownership percentage, calculated as the percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the company’s common shares 
outstanding × 1,000,000; EBS is the efficient board size, a dummy variable equal to one if the board size is between four and 12 directors, and zero otherwise. The subscripts A and T indicate 
acquiring banks and target banks, respectively. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement date.  
Panel A. Correlation results of regression models for target side  
  PREMIUM 
TCAR                 
(-1,1) 
OV                       
_T 
DOM                   
_T 
OV_             
DOM_T 
PM 
GEO                
_DIV 
ACT              
_DIV 
SIEZ                   
_T 
ROE       
_T 
MB              
_T 
CA             
_T 
OP                    
_T 
EBS                   
_T 
              
PREMIUM 1 0.57 -0.01 0.19 0.2 -0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.13 -0.06 -0.23 -0.02 -0.14 0.08 
       
TCAR(-1,1) 0.57 1 -0.02 0.13 0.1 0.13 -0.21 -0.06 -0.23 -0.19 -0.27 0.06 -0.09 0.1 
       
OV_T -0.01 -0.02 1 0.16 0.4 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.28 0.38 -0.11 -0.08 -0.24 
       
DOM_T 0.19 0.13 0.16 1 0.42 -0.15 0.16 -0.02 0.23 0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.17 -0.14 
       
OV_DOM_T 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.42 1 -0.18 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.22 -0.12 0 -0.17 
       
PM -0.03 0.13 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 1 -0.04 -0.19 -0.23 -0.2 -0.25 0.31 0.07 0.17 
       
GEO_DIV 0.02 -0.21 0.06 0.16 0.14 -0.04 1 -0.14 0.55 0.23 0.29 -0.1 0.05 -0.35 
       
ACT_DIV 0.14 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.19 -0.14 1 -0.27 0.14 -0.11 0.02 0.06 0.28 
       
SIEZ_T -0.13 -0.23 0.13 0.23 0.19 -0.23 0.55 -0.27 1 0.32 0.47 -0.27 -0.28 -0.6 
       
ROE_T -0.06 -0.19 0.28 0.01 0.17 -0.2 0.23 0.14 0.32 1 0.48 -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 
       
MB_T -0.23 -0.27 0.38 0.06 0.22 -0.25 0.29 -0.11 0.47 0.48 1 -0.22 -0.31 -0.43 
       
CA_T -0.02 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 0.31 -0.1 0.02 -0.27 -0.22 -0.22 1 0.17 0.21 
       
OP_T -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 0.17 0 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.28 -0.17 -0.31 0.17 1 0.28 
       
EBS_T 0.08 0.1 -0.24 -0.14 -0.17 0.17 -0.35 0.28 -0.6 -0.21 -0.43 0.21 0.28 1 
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Panel B. Correlation results of regression models for bidder side 
  PREMIUM 
BCAR               
(-1,1) 
OV                      
_A 
DOM                   
_A 
OV_                            
DOM_A 
PM 
GEO               
_DIV 
ACT              
_DIV 
SIZE                   
_A 
ROE       
_A 
MB              
_A 
CA            
_A 
OP                      
_A 
EBS                   
_A 
              
PREMIUM 1 -0.37 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 0.1 -0.05 -0.03 
       
BCAR(-1,1) -0.37 1 -0.41 -0.36 -0.34 0.19 -0.33 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 -0.14 0.05 0.03 0.15 
       
OV_A 0.02 -0.41 1 0.25 0.45 -0.18 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.46 0.13 -0.1 0.16 0.03 
       
DOM_A 0.11 -0.36 0.25 1 0.48 -0.22 0.43 0.12 0.37 0.16 -0.1 0 0.16 -0.18 
       
OV_DOM_A 0.03 -0.34 0.45 0.48 1 -0.12 0.39 0.22 0.37 0.31 -0.1 -0.12 0.23 -0.02 
       
PM -0.03 0.19 -0.18 -0.22 -0.12 1 -0.04 -0.19 -0.15 -0.14 -0.24 0.04 -0.02 0.23 
       
GEO_DIV 0.02 -0.33 0.27 0.43 0.39 -0.04 1 -0.14 0.57 0.2 0.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.37 
       
ACT_DIV 0.14 -0.25 0.29 0.12 0.22 -0.19 -0.14 1 -0.24 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.3 
       
SIZE_A -0.15 -0.23 0.29 0.37 0.37 -0.15 0.57 -0.24 1 0.33 0.13 -0.19 -0.22 -0.41 
       
ROE_A -0.01 -0.23 0.46 0.16 0.31 -0.14 0.2 0.11 0.33 1 0.48 -0.16 0.06 -0.02 
       
MB_A -0.02 -0.14 0.13 -0.1 -0.1 -0.24 0.13 -0.05 0.13 0.48 1 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 
       
CA_A 0.1 0.05 -0.1 0 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.16 0.11 1 0.04 0.08 
       
OP_A -0.05 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.23 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.04 1 0.18 
       
EBS_A -0.03 0.15 0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.23 -0.37 0.3 -0.41 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.18 1 
       
Panel C. Correlation results of regression models for combined side 
  




DOM               
_T 
OV_            
DOM_T 
OV         
_A 
DOM             
_A 
OV_                                 
DOM_A 
RS PM 
GEO               
_DIV 
ACT                
_DIV 
ROE   
_T 
ROE           
_A 
MB                     
_T 
MB        
_A 
CA                  
_T 
CA           
_A 
OP                    
_T 
OP              
_A 
EBS                                    
_T 
EBS       
_A 
CCAR(-1,1) 1 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.54 -0.44 -0.47 0.3 0.23 -0.37 -0.31 -0.22 -0.3 -0.09 -0.1 0.07 0.1 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.06 
OV_T -0.09 1 0.16 0.4 0.16 0.05 0.09 0 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.07 0.38 0.2 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 -0.24 0.02 
DOM_T -0.11 0.16 1 0.42 -0.03 0.26 0.09 0.02 -0.15 0.16 -0.02 0.01 -0.18 0.06 -0.14 -0.05 0.09 0.17 -0.09 -0.14 -0.24 
OV_DOM_T -0.12 0.4 0.42 1 0.1 0.21 0.1 0.02 -0.18 0.14 0.06 0.17 -0.04 0.22 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 0 -0.1 -0.17 -0.11 
OV_A -0.54 0.16 -0.03 0.1 1 0.32 0.45 -0.21 -0.18 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.46 0.05 0.13 -0.09 -0.1 0.03 0.16 -0.11 0.03 
DOM_A -0.44 0.05 0.26 0.21 0.32 1 0.48 -0.04 -0.22 0.43 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.02 -0.1 -0.14 0 0.09 0.16 -0.13 -0.18 
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OV_DOM_A -0.47 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.45 0.48 1 -0.16 -0.12 0.39 0.22 0.18 0.31 0.04 -0.1 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 0.23 -0.09 -0.02 
RS 0.3 0 0.02 0.02 -0.21 -0.04 -0.16 1 -0.14 0.07 -0.21 -0.05 -0.14 0.2 0.15 -0.09 0.19 -0.12 -0.06 -0.18 -0.03 
PM 0.23 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.12 -0.14 1 -0.04 -0.19 -0.2 -0.14 -0.25 -0.24 0.31 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.17 0.23 
GEO_DIV -0.37 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.27 0.43 0.39 0.07 -0.04 1 -0.14 0.23 0.2 0.29 0.13 -0.1 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.35 -0.37 
ACT_DIV -0.31 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.29 0.12 0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 1 0.14 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0.28 0.3 
ROE_T -0.22 0.28 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.18 -0.05 -0.2 0.23 0.14 1 0.41 0.48 0.29 -0.22 -0.02 -0.17 -0.14 -0.21 -0.24 
ROE_A -0.3 0.07 -0.18 -0.04 0.46 0.16 0.31 -0.14 -0.14 0.2 0.11 0.41 1 0.27 0.48 -0.02 -0.16 -0.14 0.06 -0.15 -0.02 
MB_T -0.09 0.38 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.2 -0.25 0.29 -0.11 0.48 0.27 1 0.59 -0.22 -0.07 -0.31 -0.15 -0.43 -0.21 
MB_A -0.1 0.2 -0.14 -0.02 0.13 -0.1 -0.1 0.15 -0.24 0.13 -0.05 0.29 0.48 0.59 1 -0.04 0.11 -0.25 -0.02 -0.16 -0.05 
CA_T 0.07 -0.11 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 0.31 -0.1 0.02 -0.22 -0.02 -0.22 -0.04 1 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.15 
CA_A 0.1 -0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.1 0 -0.12 0.19 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 0.11 0.18 1 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 
OP_T -0.07 -0.08 0.17 0 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.17 -0.14 -0.31 -0.25 0.17 -0.04 1 0.24 0.28 0.01 
OP_A -0.05 0.04 -0.09 -0.1 0.16 0.16 0.23 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.14 0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.24 1 0.17 0.18 
EBS_T 0.11 -0.24 -0.14 -0.17 -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -0.18 0.17 -0.35 0.28 -0.21 -0.15 -0.43 -0.16 0.21 0.07 0.28 0.17 1 0.41 









“However, Baum (2006) points out that the preliminary correlation matrix may not 
show strong evidence in detecting the multicollinearity problem. In order to undertake 
an efficient statistical diagnosis, many empirical studies adopt the variation inflation 
factors (VIF) to identify the multicollinearity phenomenon (Lin, 2008; Alheety and 
Gore, 2009; Redmayne et al., 2011).The main aim of VIF analysis is to test the 
increasing level of each regressor’s variance because of the multicollinearity problem. 
The traditional VIF analysis contains two steps. The first step is to run an OLS 
regression with one specific explanatory variable as the dependent variable and other 
explanatory elements as independent variables. The second step is to calculate the 
VIF with the coefficient determination (  
 ) derived from the first step, which is shown 
in equation 2.9:  
     
 
    
                  (2.9) 
 
Following Baum (2006), the average VIF value is generated based on the OLS 
regression models where year dummy variables are also included. The 
multicollinearity problem can be detected if the largest VIF value is greater than 10. 
Table 2.6 shows VIF results with the descending order of regression models for target, 
bidder and combined side through equations 2.4.1 to 2.6.3. As mean value of each 
model presented in all three panels of Table 2.6 is smaller than 4 while the largest 
VIF value of each model is also smaller than 10, it is thus comfortable to suggest that 
the multicollinearity problem does not affect the precise of estimating results through 










Table 2.6 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Analysis of Multicollinearity 
Table 2.6 shows the VIF analysis for explanatory variables of OLS regression models 2.4.1 to 2.6.3 where year 
dummy variables are also included. Panels A, B and C display the VIF results for target, bidder and combined side, 
respectively. The variables OV_T, DOM_T and OV_DOM_T are for overconfident, dominating and 
overconfident-dominating target CEOs, respectively, while OV_A, DOM_A and OV_DOM_A are for 
overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating acquiring CEOs, respectively. The payment method (PM) 
involves a dummy variable that equals one if a deal is financed with more than 50% cash, and zero otherwise; 
GEO_DIV and ACT_DIV refer to geography diversifying and activity diversifying mergers; Relative size (RS) is 
defined as the fiscal year end book value of total assets in target banks divided by the book value of total assets in 
bidder banks before the announcement date. Size is the logarithmic value of the book value of total assets; ROE is 
calculated as the net income available divided by the fiscal year end book value of the common equity of 
shareholders; MB is the market-to-book ratio, computed as the sum of total assets and the market value of equity, 
minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets; CA is the CA ratio, which equals to the sum of tier 1 and 
tier 2 capital divided by the risky weighted average assets; OP is CEO ownership percentage, calculated as the 
percentage of the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the company’s common shares outstanding × 
1,000,000; EBS is the efficient board size, a dummy variable equal to one if the board size is between four and 12 
directors, and zero otherwise. Variables Y1 to Y10 refer to year dummy variables which indicate year 1996 to year 
2005. The subscripts A and T indicate acquiring banks and target banks, respectively. All variables are measured at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement date.  
Panel A. Variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for target side  
Target CEO Overconfidence 
 
Target CEO Dominance 
 
Target CEO Overconfidence-Dominance 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Y4 7.75  0.13  
 
Y4 7.69  0.13  
 
Y4 7.70  0.13  
Y3 7.51  0.13  
 
Y3 7.21  0.14  
 
Y3 7.24  0.14  
Y8 6.70  0.15  
 
Y8 6.56  0.15  
 
Y8 6.56  0.15  
Y6 6.58  0.15  
 
Y6 6.48  0.15  
 
Y6 6.54  0.15  
Y5 6.48  0.15  
 
Y5 6.46  0.15  
 
Y5 6.45  0.16  
Y10 6.09  0.16  
 
Y10 6.07  0.16  
 
Y10 6.06  0.17  
Y2 5.70  0.18  
 
Y2 5.66  0.18  
 
Y2 5.63  0.18  
Y9 5.42  0.18  
 
Y9 5.24  0.19  
 
Y9 5.25  0.19  
Y1 3.86  0.26  
 
Y1 3.80  0.26  
 
Y1 3.79  0.26  
MB_T 2.75  0.36  
 
SIZE_T 2.85  0.35  
 
SIZE_T 2.72  0.37  
SIZE_T 2.71  0.37  
 
MB_T 2.58  0.39  
 
MB_T 2.62  0.38  
Y7 2.33  0.43  
 
Y7 2.26  0.44  
 
Y7 2.28  0.44  
EBS_T 2.11  0.47  
 
EBS_T 2.04  0.49  
 
EBS_T 2.03  0.49  
GEO_DIV 1.99  0.50  
 
GEO_DIV 1.97  0.51  
 
GEO_DIV 1.96  0.51  
ROE_T 1.92  0.52  
 
ROE_T 1.91  0.52  
 
ROE_T 1.88  0.53  
PM 1.61  0.62  
 
PM 1.61  0.62  
 
PM 1.61  0.62  
OV_T 1.44  0.69  
 
OP_T 1.48  0.67  
 
CA_T 1.43  0.70  
CA_T 1.43  0.70  
 
CA_T 1.43  0.70  
 
ACT_DIV 1.42  0.70  
ACT_DIV 1.42  0.71  
 
ACT_DIV 1.41  0.71  
 
OP_T 1.40  0.71  
OP_T 1.39  0.72  
 
DOM_T 1.27  0.79  
 
OV_DOM_T 1.24  0.81  
Mean VIF 3.86  
 
  Mean VIF 3.80  
 
  Mean VIF 3.79  
 
Panel B. Variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for bidder side  
Acquiring CEO Overconfidence 
 




Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Y4 8.25  0.12  
 
Y4 8.31  0.12  
 
Y4 8.41  0.12  
Y3 7.42  0.13  
 
Y3 7.37  0.14  
 
Y3 7.48  0.13  
Y8 7.20  0.14  
 
Y8 7.24  0.14  
 
Y8 7.25  0.14  
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Y6 6.66  0.15  
 
Y6 6.70  0.15  
 
Y6 6.76  0.15  
Y5 6.41  0.16  
 
Y5 6.54  0.15  
 
Y5 6.48  0.15  
Y10 6.03  0.17  
 
Y10 6.03  0.17  
 
Y10 6.07  0.16  
Y2 5.85  0.17  
 
Y2 5.98  0.17  
 
Y2 5.97  0.17  
Y9 5.48  0.18  
 
Y9 5.48  0.18  
 
Y9 5.50  0.18  
Y1 3.94  0.25  
 
Y1 3.95  0.25  
 
Y1 3.94  0.25  
SIZE_A 2.51  0.40  
 
SIZE_A 2.58  0.39  
 
SIZE_A 2.58  0.39  
ROE_A 2.32  0.43  
 
MB_A 2.29  0.44  
 
ROE_A 2.24  0.45  
MB_A 2.10  0.48  
 
ROE_A 2.17  0.46  
 
MB_A 2.22  0.45  
Y7 2.07  0.48  
 
GEO_DIV 2.12  0.47  
 
GEO_DIV 2.13  0.47  
GEO_DIV 1.96  0.51  
 
Y7 2.06  0.49  
 
Y7 2.06  0.48  
EBS_A 1.83  0.55  
 
EBS_A 1.82  0.55  
 
OV_DOM_A 1.96  0.51  
OV_A 1.76  0.57  
 
DOM_A 1.76  0.57  
 
EBS_A 1.83  0.55  
PM 1.54  0.65  
 
PM 1.59  0.63  
 
PM 1.55  0.65  
ACT_DIV 1.53  0.65  
 
CA_A 1.46  0.68  
 
ACT_DIV 1.54  0.65  
CA_A 1.41  0.71  
 
ACT_DIV 1.46  0.68  
 
CA_A 1.41  0.71  
OP_A 1.20  0.83  
 
OP_A 1.25  0.80  
 
OP_A 1.30  0.77  
Mean VIF 3.87     Mean VIF 3.91     Mean VIF 3.93   






Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Y4 8.35  0.12  
 
Y4 8.44  0.12  
 
Y4 8.56  0.12  
Y3 8.20  0.12  
 
Y3 7.94  0.13  
 
Y3 8.11  0.12  
Y8 7.53  0.13  
 
Y8 7.55  0.13  
 
Y8 7.53  0.13  
Y6 7.20  0.14  
 
Y6 7.25  0.14  
 
Y6 7.30  0.14  
Y5 6.78  0.15  
 
Y5 6.98  0.14  
 
Y5 6.87  0.15  
Y2 6.29  0.16  
 
Y2 6.53  0.15  
 
Y2 6.44  0.16  
Y10 6.15  0.16  
 
Y10 6.16  0.16  
 
Y10 6.20  0.16  
Y9 5.71  0.18  
 
Y9 5.57  0.18  
 
Y9 5.61  0.18  
Y1 4.09  0.24  
 
Y1 4.11  0.24  
 
Y1 4.06  0.25  
MB_T 3.35  0.30  
 
MB_T 3.30  0.30  
 
MB_T 3.29  0.30  
MB_A 2.64  0.38  
 
MB_A 2.78  0.36  
 
MB_A 2.79  0.36  
ROE_A 2.55  0.39  
 
ROE_A 2.42  0.41  
 
ROE_A 2.44  0.41  
Y7 2.42  0.41  
 
Y7 2.36  0.42  
 
Y7 2.37  0.42  
ROE_T 2.16  0.46  
 
EBS_A 2.09  0.48  
 
ROE_T 2.07  0.48  
EBS_T 2.12  0.47  
 
ROE_T 2.09  0.48  
 
EBS_A 2.05  0.49  
EBS_A 2.09  0.48  
 
EBS_T 2.01  0.50  
 
EBS_T 2.00  0.50  
ACT_DIV 1.85  0.54  
 
GEO_DIV 1.96  0.51  
 
GEO_DIV 1.96  0.51  
PM 1.85  0.54  
 
PM 1.90  0.53  
 
OV_DOM_A 1.88  0.53  
OV_A 1.81  0.55  
 
DOM_A 1.83  0.54  
 
PM 1.88  0.53  
GEO_DIV 1.71  0.59  
 
ACT_DIV 1.75  0.57  
 
ACT_DIV 1.83  0.55  
CA_T 1.53  0.66  
 
CA_A 1.54  0.65  
 
RS 1.51  0.66  
OV_T 1.52  0.66  
 
RS 1.53  0.66  
 
CA_T 1.51  0.66  
RS 1.51  0.66  
 
CA_T 1.52  0.66  
 
CA_A 1.50  0.67  
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CA_A 1.51  0.66  
 
OP_T 1.48  0.67  
 
OP_T 1.45  0.69  
OP_T 1.44  0.70  
 
DOM_T 1.48  0.68  
 
OP_A 1.33  0.75  
OP_A 1.25  0.80  
 
OP_A 1.29  0.78  
 
OV_DOM_T 1.29  0.78  
Mean VIF 3.60      Mean VIF 3.61      Mean VIF 3.61    
 
 
 6. Give more details and justify the use of Huber-White estimator of 
variance. 
 
Although the Huber-White estimator of variance could be selected as the robust 
approach for estimating empirical models in STATA software, it is still essential to 
show the reason in explaining the adoption of that model rather than just mention it in 
the table description part. Therefore, I add the paragraph of Huber-White estimator of 
variance as the part of regression methods in page 45 and 46 [old version: P44]: 
 
“All regression models are robust to Huber-White estimator of variance. Although the 
traditional OLS regression produces the most efficient and consistent estimating 
results among other estimators from the parameterization model under the 
assumption of Gauss-Markov theorem, the OLS estimator becomes inefficient when 
regression errors are not independent identically distributed (i.i.d). In fact, Baum 
(2006) indicates two methods, the robustness and efficiency approach in dealing with 
the conditional heteroskedasticity problem over model regression procedures. 
Comparing with the efficiency approach, the author suggests that the robustness 
approach relaxes more restrictions on the estimator since the rational of the approach 
is to correct the variance-covariance estimator (VCE) of the regressor when the 
consistency of the estimator is sufficiently good. Although the efficiency approach may 
provide a more efficient estimator than the robustness approach, the procedure is 
more complicated and uncertain as it requires integrating “an explicit specification” 




The Huber-White (also known as Huber-White-Sandwich) estimator of variance is a 
general type of the robustness approach which is introduced by Huber (1967) and 
White (1982). The Huber-White method produces consistent covariance matrix 
regardless the distributional assumptions of error terms and the incorrect coefficient 
estimators. Therefore, because of these unique advantages, the Huber-White estimator 
of variance is widely adopted in empirical panel data regression models, such as 
generalized regression models and multivariate regression models (Crowder, 2001). 
Therefore, as suggested in Carroll et al., (1998) that Huber-White estimator is favored 
since it only estimates one variable’s consistent variance under the asymptotic normal 
distribution and needs no precise estimation of the covariance matrix.” 
 
 7. While some interesting comments were made to the main findings, the 
discussion of the empirical results could show a more critical grasp by 
providing a fuller / in-depth explanations and economic interpretations; and 
be compared to that of prior studies. 
 
During the VIVA procedure, Professor Xiaming Liu points out that the discussion of 
main results should be compared with previous studies. I think this comment is for the 
whole thesisTherefore, I add some comparison analysis with prior studies. For 
example, I discuss the reason why study by Malmendier and Tate (2008) fails to 
consider the target side as they do not have access to the target side data in the last 
paragraph in page 28. Moreover, I also provide the detail information of the sample 
selection which shows a more trustable procedure of sample establishment in page 32. 
Link with the comment four, the adjusted R-squares comparison with previous studies 







 8. Need to provide clearer notations and equations, e.g., eqt 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
Estimation equations in prior version combine both target and bidder side which may 
lead to the misunderstanding of empirical predictions. In the new version of the thesis, 
I separate regression models for target side and bidder side, respectively. The new 
content starts from page 41 displays the clearer notations of prior equation 2.4 and 2.5 
in page 41 of the old version: 
 
“In line with Gaspar et al. (2005), for the first and second hypotheses the target firm 
characteristics are controlled in the regression model, while when testing the third, 
fourth and fifth hypotheses the bidder firm characteristics are controlled. Finally, 
when testing the merger synergistic value, which is the sixth hypothesis, both target 
and bidder firm characteristics, such as relative size, are controlled. Equations 2.4.1 
to 2.4.6 show the regression model testing whether overconfident, dominating and 
overconfident-dominating target CEOs negotiate higher merger premiums and thus 
significantly generates higher merger premiums from acquiring firms during the 
merger negotiation process: 
 
                                                   
                                                      
(2.4.1) 
                                                    
                                                      
(2.4.2) 
                                                       




                                                          
                                            
(2.4.4)                                                              
                                                 
                                                      
 (2.4.5) 
                                                    
                                                      
                                                               (2.4.6) 
where the merger premium is the one-week offer price prior to the merger 
announcement date from Thomson One Banker.      is three-day CARs computed 
by the market model. Following Gupta and Misra (2007), the market model 
coefficients are estimated with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio over the period 
(-250, -21) (the merger announcement day is denoted as day 0).        ,        and 
           refer to overconfident, dominating, and overconfident-dominating target 
CEOs for bank i in fiscal year t, respectively. These variables will be examined 
separately and are expected to have a positive effect on merger premiums. All target 
firm-related variables are included in the model, such as         ,        , 
      ,       ,      , and         while merger-related variables,   ,       and 
      are included in all regression estimations.  
 
A similar regression model is adopted to estimate the merger premiums and stock 
market responses to deals undertaken by overconfident, dominating, and 




                                                   
                                                      
(2.5.1) 
                                                    
                                                      
(2.5.2) 
                                                       
                                                      
(2.5.3) 
                                                          
                                            
(2.5.4)                                                              
                                                           
                                            
 (2.5.5) 
                                                    
                                                      
                                                               (2.5.6) 
All regression variables hold the same definition in prior regression models (2.4.1) to 
(2.4.6) since equations (2.5.1) to (2.5.6) consider the situation of bidder side. 
Coefficients of       ,         and            are expected to be significant 
positively related with merger premium and negatively related with the market 





 9. Pay careful attention to the choice of wording (e.g., ‘hand-collected’ data, 
‘empirical’ hypothesis, ‘common’ financial decisions, and power vs. 
dominance, etc.)  
 
The following table shows the change of wording in the thesis: 
 
Original Wording Current Wording 
Page Number                          
(Old Version) 
Page Number                         
(New Version) 
hand-collected manually collected P8 P8 
hand-collected manually-collected P135 P146 
hand-collected manually collected P153 P164 
hand-collected manually collected P154 P165 
common financial 
decisions 
those financial decisions P3 P3 
common financial 
decisions 
financial decisions P3 P3 
common financial 
decisions 
bank financial decisions P7 P7 
power vs. dominance  
Please check the 4
th
 footnote in page 18 which is displayed in the 
new version of my PhD thesis. 
 
 10. The overall presentation could be further improved with minor editing 
and proofreading. 
 
According to the suggestion from the VIVA, I repeat the proofreading for my 
modified thesis while the following table shows the editing results: 
 
Original Wording Current Wording 
Page Number/Part                          
(Old Version) 
Page Number/Part                     
(New Version) 
CEO Overconfidence and 
Power in Bank Financial 
Decisions: The US 
Evidence  
CEO Overconfidence and 
Dominance in Bank 
Financial Decisions: The US 
Evidence  
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"firm specific" P98 P109 
The 10
th
 line from the 
top"691 banks and bank 
holding companies" 





line from the 
bottom: "fail at least twice" 
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